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Abstract
We use data from Chile’s conditional voucher program to test the effects of vouch-
ers on academic achievement. Conditional vouchers have delivered extra resources
to low-income, vulnerable students since 2008. Moreover, under this scheme, addi-
tional resources are contingent on the completion of specific scholastic goals. Using a
difference-in-differences approach, we find a positive and significant effect of vouch-
ers on standardized test scores. Additionally, our results highlight the importance of
conditioning the delivery of resources to some specific academic goals when frictions
exist in the education market.
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I. Introduction
A central question in education economics is how to increase the quality of schools that
low-income students attend. Since Friedman wrote his 1955 essay on the role of govern-
ment in education, many have considered the use of vouchers to be a promising way to
increase the education quality supplied by schools (Friedman, 1955). However, at the
empirical level, the literature is far from reaching a consensus. This paper contributes
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to the literature by providing additional empirical evidence on the effects of vouchers
on academic achievement. Our results show that vouchers have a positive and signifi-
cant effect on standardized test scores. Additionally, we show that focusing resources on
specific scholastic commitments enhances the efficacy of vouchers in promoting a higher
quality of education. Therefore, some conditionality in the delivery of resources seems to
be an effective way of increasing students’ academic achievement in markets where some
frictions may exist.
At a theoretical level, vouchers can raise the academic results of low-income students
through three main channels. First, simply, they allow low-income students to migrate
from bad public schools to good private schools (if private schools indeed offer a higher
quality of education than public schools). Second, vouchers introduce competition to
public schools when they are inefficient local monopolies. When subsidies are allocated
only to public schools, they face a fixed demand and thus have no incentives to supply a
high education quality. Vouchers allow low-income students to migrate to private schools;
the demand for public schools is no longer fixed. Therefore, if parents were allowed to
choose freely among schools, vouchers should raise the education quality supplied by
public schools in an environment where schools compete through quality supplied to the
market. Third, if the incidence of the demand subsidy (the voucher) on the supply of
education is nonzero, vouchers (or an increase in the resources delivered by vouchers
to schools) increase the margin per enrolled students (the difference between the total
monetary payments and the cost of educating a student) and thus encourage schools to
attract more students. If there is competition, education quality increases within both
public and private schools even if there is no migration of students from public to private
schools (there would be greater competition within school types).
In 1981, Chile’s government began to provide vouchers to any student wishing to
attend a private school (called voucher private schools in this paper). Chile’s voucher
experiment can be easily used to test the first channel mentioned above by looking at
two pieces of data: first, the strength of the migration of students from public to private
schools and, second, the difference in the academic performance in those types of schools.
Figure 1 shows a strong migration of students from public schools to private schools.
Additionally, Figure 2 shows significant unconditional differences in the average results
on a standardized test (SIMCE)1 between public and voucher private schools, although
those results could be simply explained by differences in the socioeconomic background
of students attending different public and private schools.
Up to 2000, the literature had found that after properly controlling for students’ so-
cioeconomic backgrounds, public and voucher private schools saw a similar performance
on achievement tests. For instance, Elacqua and Fabrega (2004) find that students at-
tending voucher private schools do not necessarily outperform public school students and
1The SIMCE (Sistema de Medicio´n de la Calidad de la Ensen˜anza) is a mandatory national standard-
ized test designed to evaluate the quality of the content taught in primary and secondary education in
math, language, geography, and science. It is administered annually to fourth, eighth, and tenth graders
through a system in which grades are chosen to be evaluated by turns.
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that competition has not necessarily improved the test results of both types of schools.
Elacqua and Fabrega (2004) argue that the only thing that can be concluded from the
Chilean experience is that free choice and competition have led to a further segmentation
of the education system. However, these studies faced important limitations associated
with the lack of control for selection bias, the estimation of homogeneous treatment ef-
fects across students with different characteristics, and the assumption that all publicly
subsidized schools operate with the same budget (Sapelli and Vial, 2002). Subsequent
studies show that after selection bias is controlled for, there is a significant difference in
the academic performance of public and voucher private schools (Contreras, 2001; Tok-
man, 2002). Sapelli and Vial (2002) find that when they control for selection bias and
student characteristics, there is a positive effect on standardized test scores in favor of
voucher private schools.2
Therefore, the migration of students from public to private schools, where there is a
difference in the education quality supplied by both types of schools, seems to be a valid
channel through which the Chilean voucher system should have increased the academic
achievement of low-income students.
When scholars have tried to use Chile’s voucher program to evaluate the second and
third channels described at the beginning of this section, the lack of a control group is one
of the main empirical problems that they have faced. Since 1981, more than 90% of schools
have received vouchers. Therefore, there is no control group to build a counterfactual for
the treatment group.
However, in 2008, the Chilean government implemented a new type of voucher pro-
gram in which extra resources were provided for low-income students, conditional on the
achievement of some specific scholastic goals. This conditional voucher program provides
a unique opportunity to build empirical evidence on how vouchers affect academic achieve-
ment by (1) forcing public schools to compete with private schools and (2) increasing the
profit margin per enrolled student in both public and private schools. Additionally, this
voucher program offers an opportunity to empirically evaluate the importance of condi-
tioning the delivery of resources to some specific academic goals in education markets
with frictions that prevent students’ mobility across schools.
The conditional voucher program aims to improve the quality of education by giving
an additional per-student subsidy to schools that voluntarily enroll vulnerable students.
Under this scheme, additional resources are contingent on the completion of specific aca-
demic goals (the so-called Educational Improvement Plan [EIP]). In exchange for these
additional resources, schools face two costs by joining this scheme. First, they must ac-
cept vulnerable students, who are more costly to educate. Second, they are not allowed
2International evidence supports the results of Sapelli and Vial (2002). Some studies on voucher
programs show how achievement growth among economically disadvantaged African-American children
in U.S. cities rises if students are able to attend private schools instead of public schools. For instance,
Howell and Peterson (2002) find evidence that African-American children benefit from access to private
schools. Pooling African-American children at all grade levels, they find that private schooling enhances
one- and two-year total achievement gains by 3.9 and 6.3 percentiles, respectively. Further, in New York
and Washington, D.C., they find that the comparable three-year gain estimate is 6.6 percentiles.
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to charge a co-payment. This trade-off (more resources in exchange for educating more
costly students and the prohibition of charging a co-payment) implies that only a frac-
tion of schools decide to receive the conditional vouchers, thus generating a control group.
Therefore, this new subsidy offers us a better opportunity to evaluate the empirical effects
of vouchers on education quality.
Before conditional vouchers were implemented, low-income, vulnerable students at-
tended free public schools only. Public schools were forced by law to enroll students who
wished to attend and were not allowed to charge any co-payment to them. Therefore,
public schools faced a fixed demand by vulnerable students because those students did
not have any alternative. Thus, public schools represented the kind of local monopolies
argued by Hoxby (2003).
When the new voucher system was implemented, public schools received an extra
amount of resources for each enrolled vulnerable student. In addition, a significant frac-
tion of private schools became receptors of conditional vouchers and, thus, began to enroll
vulnerable students. The appearance of private schools enrolling low-income, vulnerable
students broke the local monopolies of public schools on those students. The demand
by vulnerable students for public schools was no longer rigid and became responsive to
changes in quality. Therefore, the conditional vouchers introduced in the Chilean educa-
tion market in 2008 should have encouraged public schools to supply a higher education
quality to avoid a massive migration of vulnerable students toward private schools.3
Additionally, in public schools, the extra resources delivered by the conditional
voucher increase the margin per enrolled vulnerable student and thus encourage schools to
attract more of those students by increasing the education quality supplied to the market.
The same happens in private schools that become receptors of this voucher (those that
charge a low co-payment, as we both theoretically and empirically show in this paper).
Therefore, an increase in the academic achievement of students within public and private
schools should be observed when the conditional voucher system is implemented, even if
the migration of students from public to private schools would not exist.
Finally, some frictions (lack of information or geographic constraints) could prevent
students from moving across schools. In that case, the demand is fixed (changes in quality
are irrelevant) and the extra resources delivered by vouchers only represent economic rents
for the owners of the schools. Therefore, a different contract must be signed in order to
guarantee improvements in school education quality. Chile’s conditional voucher program
introduces a simple contract in which resources are contingent on the achievement of some
minimum required quality. We show that conditionality encourages the supply of a high
education quality in markets where some frictions may exist.
Therefore, we expect conditional vouchers to have positive effects on academic
achievement. We test those effects empirically in this paper. However, some empiri-
cal difficulties arise. The migration of students from public to private schools could, by
3Of course, this conclusion holds as long as the total resources delivered by the conditional voucher
and the flat voucher existing since 1981 are greater than the cost of educating a vulnerable student.
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itself, affect the average academic achievement. For instance, assume that some vulner-
able students with very low human capital migrate to private schools. If public/private
schools are more/less effective in educating students with lower human capital, the average
academic results could change even if nothing more happens. Additionally, the increase
in education attainment for vulnerable students could also affect the average academic
results of schools. To solve those difficulties, we first control for students’ socioeconomic
backgrounds, which allows us to put aside the effect of changes in the composition of stu-
dents attending public and private schools. Second, we include school-level fixed effects to
control for potential self-selection of schools into the new voucher program. Third, we use
a difference-in-differences approach. It allows us to remove the biases that result from the
comparison of both groups in the second period and that can be explained by permanent
differences between them and differences across time due to group-specific trends.4
We first use a sample of public and private schools. Controlling for students’ so-
cioeconomic backgrounds and for national trends, we find a positive and significant effect
of conditional vouchers on standardized test scores for math. For language, we find no
significant effect under some specifications. These positive effects of vouchers on academic
achievement (mainly in math test scores) are explained by a mix of higher competition
for public schools and a higher margin per enrolled vulnerable student for both public
and private schools. Moreover, after including school progress in the EIP, we find that a
higher degree of accomplishment further raises test scores, in addition to the direct effect.
Therefore, conditionality matters. Our results show that focusing resources on specific
scholastic commitments (i.e., the EIP in the Chilean system) enhances the efficacy of
vouchers in promoting a higher quality of education in markets in which some frictions
may exist.
Next, we use a sample of only private schools. Even though two channels (more
competition and a greater margin per enrolled student) operate for public schools and
just one (a greater margin per enrolled student) operates for private schools, the mag-
nitude of the effects is slightly greater for private schools. Our interpretation of these
results is that public schools could face incentives different from the textbook case in
which schools simply maximize profits. Sapelli (2003) indicates that a key element to
evaluating the results of the Chilean voucher system is its design, which is far from the
ideal case in which both public and voucher private schools operate under the same inter-
nal and external rules (i.e., under the same budgets and regulatory frameworks). In the
Chilean case, public schools are regulated by a Teaching Statute and receive additional
funds from municipalities when necessary. Together, these differences would determine
the budget constraints of public and voucher private schools and, hence, the effect of
competition on their academic achievement. Along the same line as Sapelli (2003), Hsieh
and Urquiola (2006) show that despite extensive private entry and sustained declines in
public enrollments, the aggregate number of municipal schools has barely fallen. Hsieh
and Urquiola (2006) argue that municipal officials seem to have been unable or unwilling
4Therefore, treatment and control schools are identical except for the fact that, after the implemen-
tation of the conditional voucher system, the treatment schools face more competition (public schools)
and receive a higher margin per enrolled student (public and voucher private schools).
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to close public schools and, thus, public schools seem to not face strong incentives to
compete. This is reinforced by the fact that, for these schools, revenue losses are medi-
ated by municipal educational budgets, which makes it possible for them to lose students
without automatic consequences on their resources. Thus, “soft budget constraints” for
public schools could explain why the conditional voucher program has increased academic
achievement in public schools but not by the magnitude suggested by our theoretical anal-
ysis. However, overall, our results confirm the positive effects of vouchers on academic
achievement and the importance of conditioning the delivery of resources to some specific
academic goals when frictions exist in the market.
Our results are line with those in Hoxby (2003) and Neal (2002). Hoxby (2003)
analyzes the impact that different programs had on school productivity: specifically, the
effect of vouchers on achievement in Milwaukee public schools and the effect of charter
schools on achievement in Michigan and Arizona public schools. Hoxby concludes that the
regular public schools boosted their productivity when exposed to competition and that
they responded to competitive threats that were surprisingly small. Neal (2002) concludes
that while it is difficult to predict the outcome of any large-scale voucher experiment,
voucher systems targeted toward large cities with a history of public school failure may
have the greatest potential for yielding large benefits. Based on the work of Nechyba
(1999) and Epple and Romano (2002), Neal conjectures that it is possible to design
targeted voucher systems that would result in better outcomes for most if not all students
in large urban school districts like those in Chicago and New York.5
On the other hand, our findings oppose those presented in Hsieh and Urquiola
(2006). Those authors use the differential impact on enrollment that the introduction of
a nationwide voucher has in Chilean communities to measure the effects of unrestricted
choice on educational outcomes. Using panel data for about 150 municipalities, they
find no evidence that choice improved average educational outcomes in Chile. Two main
factors could help to reconciliate our results with those of Hsieh and Urquiola (2006).
First, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) do not control for changes in the composition of stu-
dents within municipalities, which could understate the effect of competition on school
outcomes. Second, the outcome measure used by the authors is the test score in the PER
(Programa de Evaluacio´n del Rendimiento Escolar). Different from the SIMCE, the PER
did not make the results of schools available to the public. Therefore, the environment in
which vouchers operated in Hsieh et al.’s period of analysis could have been much more
frictional than the environment in which the conditional vouchers evaluated in this paper
were implemented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the institutional
details of the conditional voucher system in Chile. Section 3 develops a theoretical model
that analyzes the effects of vouchers on the quality of education supplied by schools in
5Rau et al. (2012) use a sequential model of schooling decisions and academic outcomes to investigate
the relative effectiveness of private-voucher schools in Chile. They analyze two particular outcomes of
interest: the probability of taking college admission tests; and, conditional on having taken these tests,
the performance on them. They find mixed results for the outcome of taking college admission tests, and
strongly positive and significant effects on test scores.
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different competition environments. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy used to test
the main predictions of the theoretical model, and section 5 describes the data. Section
6 presents and discusses the results. Finally, section 7 concludes.
II. Chile’s Conditional Voucher Program
A. The Educational System before the Conditional Vouchers
In 1980, Chile implemented several educational reforms seeking to improve education
quality and the efficient use of resources by fostering competition between schools. Before
these reforms, Chile had a centralized education system whereby the vast majority of
schools were publicly financed and the Ministry of Education was directly responsible for
designing and overseeing the implementation of all education policies, both substantive
and administrative.6 Three main changes were particularly transformative. First, admin-
istrative responsibility over public schools was transferred from the Ministry of Education
to each municipal government, resulting in a more decentralized configuration. Second,
a new scholastic subsidy system was introduced as the principal financing mechanism.
Subsidized private schools began to receive exactly the same per-student payment as the
public (municipal) schools. To distinguish these institutions from the subsidized private
schools that existed before the reforms (mainly religious), we will call them voucher pri-
vate schools. The subsidy was calculated as a function of total student enrollment and
average student attendance. Third, the government moved to actively encourage the par-
ticipation of private entities in the financing and administration of educational institutions
(Larranaga, 1995; Vial, 1998; Gonza´lez et al., 2002; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003).
By making public funding directly contingent on student enrollment and retention,
schools should compete for a larger share of the student body by offering a better ed-
ucation. However, in their efforts to minimize educational costs and maximize funding,
private and voucher private schools employed competitive admission processes to admit
only the most promising applicants (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003; Elacqua and Fabrega,
2004). In contrast, public schools with vacancies were legally obliged to admit all appli-
cants regardless of their academic potential or socioeconomic backgrounds. As a result,
those students who displayed more academic potential became increasingly enrolled in
private or voucher private schools, while those who displayed less academic promise were
forced to enroll in municipal schools that, paradoxically, also received less funding. Be-
cause academic potential tends to be positively correlated with socioeconomic background,
this segmentation resulted in the concentration of wealthier students in wealthier private
or voucher private schools and more vulnerable students in poorer municipal schools.
In 1993, voucher private schools were allowed to charge students an additional tuition
6At the beginning of 1980, more than 90% of all Chilean students were enrolled in institutions directly
dependent on the Ministry of Education, and only the remaining 10% were enrolled in completely private
institutions.
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fee to complement the state subsidy (Larranaga, 1995; Gonza´lez et al., 2002).7 This system
of shared financing encouraged schools with a better academic record to charge higher fees
than their less successful counterparts, leading to increased socioeconomic segmentation
and greater funding inequality.
Therefore, since 1993, the Chilean primary and secondary education system has been
composed of three types of schools: (i) public schools financed by government subsidies
based on students’ attendance and by additional funds from local governments (munici-
palities); (ii) private schools that are also financed by the government and by co-payments
made by parents (voucher private schools); and (iii) private schools financed exclusively
by parents (private schools).8
B. The Conditional Voucher Program (SEP)
Created in 2008, the conditional voucher program (SEP9) aims to improve the quality
of education of the most vulnerable students by giving an additional per-student subsidy
to schools that voluntarily enter the SEP program. By providing additional resources to
less advantaged students, named priority students, the additional subsidy aims to both
improve the quality of education received by priority students and decrease socioeco-
nomic inequality in the academic performance of students from different socioeconomic
backgrounds, through a combination of individually allocated additional funds and an
incentive-based school reform program. Moreover, for the first time, under this scheme
additional resources are contingent on the completion of specific scholastic reforms and
improvements in school academic performance on a standardized test (SIMCE).
B..1 Who Are Priority Students?
The fundamental basis of the SEP is the targeted support of a specific group of underpriv-
ileged and vulnerable students through additional subsidies. To automatically qualify as
priority, a student must meet one of the following criteria in order, proceeding to further
criteria if and only if the preceding one is not applicable: (i) participation in the Chile
Solidario program (a social welfare program protecting those in extreme poverty), (ii)
being in the most vulnerable third of the population according to the latest measurement
instrument, or (iii) belonging to the most vulnerable group in the National Health Fund
(FONASA). If none of the preceding criteria are available, the student’s position can also
be temporarily established according to their family socioeconomic background.
7Subsidy law limited the family contribution to no more than US$153 per month (in 2012 values).
8Public, voucher private schools, and private schools represented 40.71%, 50.73%, and 8.56%, respec-
tively, of the total enrollment in primary and secondary education in 2010.
9SEP stands for Subvencio´n Escolar Preferenial, the official name in Chile for the conditional voucher
program.
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B..2 The Educational Improvement Plan
To receive SEP funds, schools are classified into three categories according to their aca-
demic performance on the SIMCE and the socioeconomic characteristics of their stu-
dents.10 After a school is classified, it has to present an Educational Improvement Plan
(EIP) to the Ministry of Education, which details educational reforms that the school will
undertake to improve SIMCE results and how SEP funds will be spent to improve the
academic performance of priority students. Although the amount of resources distributed
to each priority student is the same for all schools and varies only by educational level,
the autonomy of schools to decide how to use those resources and under what level of
supervision will depend on the school’s classification.11
While the EIPs form the central aspect of the incentives system inherent in the SEP
law, in practice, they are only a part of the Equality of Opportunity and Educational
Excellence Agreement (Convenio de Igualdad de Oportunidades y Excelencia Educativa)
that each institution must sign. In addition to a commitment to produce and complete
an EIP, the agreement also mandates that schools report the use of all resources received
under the program and the status of specific projects, that all priority students must
be allowed to attend free of tuition and costs (they cannot be required to pay any co-
payment), that all admissions must be open to any prospective student,12 and that schools
must retain all students, even those with poor academic performance. These limitations
on SEP funding and requirements for participation in the program are designed primarily
to ensure that high-performing schools are accessible to all low-income students and that
schools are not allowed to give preference to highly qualified priority students.
Additionally, according to SEP law, schools cannot select students between preschool
and sixth grade on the basis of their academic performance or family socioeconomic
background. If the demand surpasses the number of available spots, students will be
admitted through a public and transparent application process that will not consider the
student’s socioeconomic status or their past or potential academic performance.
B..3 Funds
SEP funding is allotted per priority student and is delivered directly to the school instead
of to any municipal funding system. It is calculated based on the average attendance
rate of priority students over the previous three months, the school’s classification as
10Depending on their performance on the SIMCE, schools could be classified as autonomous (if their
performance is at or above the median for their SIMCE group), emergent (if their performance is below
the median for their SIMCE group), or in recuperation (applied to emergent institutions that fail, after
four years, to meet the quantitative goals required by the program).
11For instance, emergent schools receive half of their funding as a subsidy and the other half as a
contribution of additional resources to design and execute their EIP, and schools that are in recuperation
receive all of their funding as a contribution of additional resources to their EIP.
12In cases where selectivity is requisite, schools may not take into account past academic performance,
current academic ability, or socioeconomic status.
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autonomous or emergent, the grade level of the priority student (younger students receive
more resources), and the concentration of priority students in the school. Table 1 shows
the monthly subsidy delivered per priority student in 2012.
In addition to the regular SEP funds, schools qualify for a subsidy if priority students
make up more than 15% of the student body. Table 2 presents the concentration subsidy
amount.
In relation to the flat voucher based on student attendance, the SEP increases the
resources given to schools for priority students by 70%. Table 3 presents the amount of
additional resources given by the SEP.
III. The Model
In this section we build a model to analyze how conditional vouchers affect the quality of
education supplied by schools. We first assume an environment of no frictions, in which
schools must offer a higher level of quality in order to attract more students. In this
scenario we study how vouchers affect academic achievement by (1) forcing public schools
to compete with private schools and (2) increasing the profit margin per enrolled student
in both public and private schools. After doing so, we introduce frictions; for example,
parents’ lack of information and/or some geographical constraints may prevent students
from moving across schools and thus produce a school-specific demand that is fixed. In
this second model, we study the role that conditionality in the delivery of resources has
on promoting a higher quality of education.
A. No Frictions
We assume that two types of schools exist: public and voucher private schools. Public
schools are not allowed to charge any fee. On the contrary, voucher private schools charge
a private co-payment that complements the resources delivered by a flat voucher. Voucher
private schools are heterogeneous in the amount of the co-payment they charge to parents.
Denote by pi the co-payment required by school i. We assume that pi has a continuous
uniform distribution with a support pi ∈ (0, p]. Therefore, for public schools pi = 0, and
for voucher private schools pi > 0.
We assume the following demand function of education:
ni (qi) = βqi, (1)
where qi denotes the quality supplied by school i. Therefore, the higher the quality
supplied by a school, the greater the demand for that school. Assume that qi ≥ 0; that
is, schools cannot supply a “negative quality.”
On the demand side, there are two groups of students. The first group is composed
of students from families who have zero income. Because their families have zero income,
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those students must attend free public schools. The second group is made up of students
from high-income families. Those families have the resources to make co-payments and,
therefore, can choose among any type of school. We assume the following cost function
of providing a quality qi to high-income (h) and low-income (l) students:
ch (q) = αqi, (2)
cl (q) = αqi; (3)
∀ α ≥ α. We assume a segregated education market in which low-income students
attend free public schools and high-income students attend voucher private schools that
require co-payments. Figure 3 shows the average family income by school dependence.
We can observe that segregation indeed exists in the Chilean education market.
Because low-income students do not have another alternative, the demand for public
education by those students is fixed. Denote by np the fixed demand for public education.
Public schools choose the quality level, qp, that maximizes their profits:
max
qp
{(v − cl (qp))np} (4)
where v is the flat voucher received by both public and voucher private schools. It is clear
that public schools have incentives to offer qp = 0.
Voucher private schools charge a co-payment and thus receive only students from
high-income families. The maximization problem, which a voucher private school i must
solve, is the following:
max
qi
{(v + pi − ch (qi))ni (qi)} . (5)
Therefore, the quality supplied by school type i is:
qi =
v + pi
2α
(6)
Notice that ∂qi/∂pi > 0. Moreover, it is straightforward to conclude that qi > qp for
all i. Therefore, voucher private schools offer a higher quality than public schools; and the
higher the co-payment charged, the higher the quality supplied. Two main reasons explain
why the quality of education in voucher private schools is higher than in public schools.
First, positive co-payments in voucher private schools bring extra resources, so it becomes
profitable to attract more students by increasing quality. Second, given that low-income
students cannot afford a private education, public schools are local monopolies for that
type of student. That is, the demand for those schools by low-income students is fixed.
Therefore, total demand for public schools is nonresponsive to changes in quality, and, as
a consequence, public schools do not have incentives to increase quality. The reason why
voucher private schools with higher co-payments offer a higher quality is that higher co-
payments increase the resources per student and thus encourage schools to attract more
students by increasing quality.
11
Figure 2 shows that the average SIMCE score is higher in voucher private schools
than in public schools. Additionally, Figure 4 plots the correlation between the co-
payment level and the SIMCE score in voucher private schools. We observe a positive
correlation, as predicted by the model. Therefore, the previous predictions of the model
are indeed observed in the data.
A..1 The Conditional Voucher Program (SEP)
We now assume that the conditional voucher program is implemented. As described in
section 2, schools that join the program must sign a contract that conditions the delivery
of extra resources to the achievement of some specific academic goals. Assume a very
simple contract to emulate the EIP, described in section 2: in exchange for new resources,
schools must warrant a quality equal to or greater than q. Denote the total amount of
resources (the flat voucher plus the extra resources) received by a school that signs the
contract by vSEP .
Only schools that accept low-income students receive the voucher vSEP . Addition-
ally, SEP private schools are not allowed to charge co-payments to vulnerable students.
Therefore, the maximization problem for SEP private schools can be expressed as follows:
max
qSEP
{(vSEP − cl (qSEP ))nSEP (qSEP )} (7)
Therefore, the optimal choice of quality is:
qSEP =
vSEP
2α
(8)
Assuming that qSEP > q we have that the conditionality imposed by the program
would not be binding in an environment where competition freely operates.
Schools that do not receive the SEP maximize the profits function (5); thus, they
offer a quality level given by equation (6).
Voucher private schools that choose to receive the SEP are those ones for which
benefits (the greater voucher) overcome costs (the loss of the co-payment and the higher
cost of educating low-income students). Therefore, we can have a co-payment level p∗,
such that schools that charge a co-payment p∗ are indifferent between becoming or not
becoming SEP schools. Schools charging a co-payment lower than p∗ become SEP schools,
whereas schools with a higher co-payment choose not to receive the SEP. The co-payment
level p∗ is given by the following expression:
p∗ = vSEP (α/α)
1
2 − v. (9)
We now impose the following constraint on vSEP , such that a positive number of
SEP and non-SEP schools exist:
0 < p∗ < p. [A.1]
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Therefore, we have that
v
(
α
α
) 1
2
< vSEP < (p+ v)
(
α
α
) 1
2
. (10)
As long as the value of vSEP satisfies inequality (10), some voucher private schools
become SEP receptors and compete with public schools for low-income students. Addi-
tionally, all public schools have incentives to become SEP receptors and get the additional
resources delivered by the SEP. Table 4 shows that this prediction is indeed observed in
the data. Almost all public schools subscribed to the SEP, whereas around half of voucher
private schools became SEP receptors.
Under the SEP system, the maximization problem of public schools is given by
equation (7), and the education quality supplied to the market is given by equation (8).
A..2 Supply of Education Quality
The type of conditional vouchers analyzed in the previous sections introduce three funda-
mental changes in the education market. First, they break the monopoly of public schools
on low-income students by allowing them to migrate to voucher private schools. Second,
they increase the margin per enrolled student as long as the extra resources outweigh the
differential cost of educating low-income students. Third, they introduce conditionality
in the delivery of resources. Even though the latter channel could be less relevant in an
environment of no frictions, the first two channels change the incentive of public as well
private schools when deciding what level of education quality to offer to the market.
Before and after the introduction of the SEP, public schools receive only low-income
students. However, when the SEP is implemented, low-income students have the chance to
attend those voucher private schools that become SEP receptors. Therefore, the demand
for public schools by low-income students is no longer fixed but is responsive to changes
in quality. Additionally, the SEP delivers extra resources to public schools, and, thus, the
margin per enrolled student is higher under the SEP system. Both facts imply that public
schools have incentives to supply a higher education quality under an SEP system than
under a non-SEP system. That conclusion is straightforward when we compare equation
(8) with our previous conclusion that public schools supply a quality level qp = 0 when
the SEP does not exist.
On the other hand, by comparing equations (6) and (8), we can establish that
voucher private schools that charge a co-payment lower than some level p∗∗ supply a
higher education quality under an SEP system than under a non-SEP system. p∗∗ is the
co-payment level that equals equations (6) and (8):
p∗∗ = vSEP (α/α)− v (11)
Figure 5 shows the relationships between p∗∗, p∗, qi and qSEP .13 From this figure, we
13Notice that p∗∗ < p∗.
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can extract four main conclusions.
First, voucher private schools that choose to be SEP receptors are those that charge
a co-payment lower than p∗. Voucher private schools must agree to receive private co-
payments from parents. That cost is higher for schools that charge a higher co-payment.
For this reason, the lower the co-payment, the greater the profitability of becoming an
SEP receptor.
Second, voucher private schools that charge a low co-payment increase the education
quality supplied under an SEP system more than under a non-SEP system. As discussed
in the introduction, the receipt of more resources per enrolled student means it is profitable
to attract more students, which encourages schools to supply a higher education quality.
Under an SEP system, the margin per enrolled student increases more for schools that
initially charged a low co-payment. That explains why those schools experience greater
increases in their education quality.
Third, the unconditional effect of the SEP on the education quality supplied by
voucher private schools is, in principle, ambiguous. As shown by Figure 5, there are
some schools (those that charge a co-payment between p∗∗ and p∗) that decrease their
education quality compared with their counterfactual scenario (the non-SEP system).
The optimal choice of education quality corresponds to the level at which the marginal
cost of further increases in quality equals the marginal benefit. For schools with a middle-
level co-payment (between p∗∗ and p∗), the SEP system increases marginal benefits by
a relatively small amount because co-payments were relatively high under the non-SEP
system. However, those schools could still have incentives to become SEP receptors.14
Fourth, notice that as the difference between educating low-income and high-income
students decreases, it is more likely to find a positive effect of the SEP on the average
education quality supplied by voucher private schools. In terms of Figure 5, the difference
between p∗∗ and p∗ decreases when α/α tends to one. For instance, if the difference in the
cost of educating low-income and high-income students is null (α/α = 1), schools that
choose to be SEP receptors are exactly those that would increase their education quality
under an SEP system (with respect to the non-SEP scenario). A direct implication of the
latter result is that, controlling for the socioeconomic background of students, we should
expect an unambiguous positive effect of the SEP on the education quality of voucher
private schools (keeping the composition of students constant is similar to imposing α = α
in terms of the model). In section 6, we test all those empirical predictions of the model.
B. Frictions
In this subsection we deviate from the no-frictions environment. Indeed, we assume that
both public and voucher private schools face a fixed demand n. Some factors that may
explain this school-specific rigid demand could be some lack of information for parents
14This conclusion is straightforward when we observe the equilibrium profits and the optimal choice of
quality.
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about school quality or students’ mobility constraints. Both factors imply that an increase
in the quality supplied may not attract more students. We can immediately conclude that
the quality supplied by all school types will be the minimum-in this case, zero. Moreover,
because the quality supplied is zero, the SEP will be ineffective in promoting a higher
quality of education. The extra resources would only be economic rents for the owners of
SEP schools.
Schools will choose to receive the SEP voucher if the following condition is satisfied:
pi < vSEP − v. (12)
Therefore, as long as vSEP > v, there will be some schools that choose to receive
the SEP voucher. In these schools, the delivery of extra resources will not be effective in
promoting a higher quality of education and would only increase profits. A different type
of contract must be designed to promote education quality.
The SEP contract establishes that schools must warrant a quality equal to or greater
than q. Schools that subscribe to this type of contract face the following maximization
problem:
max
qSEP
{(vSEP − αqSEP )n} , (13)
such that
qSEP ≥ q. (14)
Therefore, SEP schools choose to offer the minimum required quality q, which is greater
than zero.
As before, we can have a co-payment level p∗, such that schools charging a co-
payment lower than p∗ choose to receive the SEP:
p∗ = (vSEP − v)− αq. (15)
As in the previous section, we impose assumption [A.1], which grants that a positive
number of SEP and non-SEP schools exist. Assumption [A.1] imposes a limit to the value
of vSEP , as the following inequality shows
15:
v + αq < vSEP < p+ v + αq. (16)
The quality supplied by schools when the SEP does not exist is simply zero. How-
ever, as long as the amount of the voucher satisfies the lower limit of inequality (16),
there will be a positive number of SEP schools, and the average quality supplied by
schools will be higher compared with that when the SEP does not exist. Therefore, when
some frictions limit competition among schools, a contract conditioning resources to the
accomplishment of some minimum quality level is effective in promoting a higher quality
of education among schools.
15As in the previous analysis, inequality (16) implies that all public schools subscribe to the SEP
contract.
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IV. Empirical Strategy
We use a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the effects of the SEP on academic
achievement. According to this methodology, there are two groups observed in two time
periods, where one is exposed to a treatment in the second period but not in the first
(treatment group). The other group is not exposed to a treatment during either period
(i.e., the control group). If the same units of the treatment and the control groups are
both in the first and second periods, the effect of the treatment could be obtained by
subtracting the average gain of the control group from the average gain of the treatment
group. This approach allows us to remove the biases that result from the comparison
of both groups in the second period and that can be explained by permanent differences
between them and differences across time due to group-specific trends.
For two periods and a treatment that occurs only in the second period, we have the
following expression:
yit = β0 + β1d2t + β2wit + uit, ∀t ∈ 1, 2; (17)
where yit is the outcome and d2t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the
second period and zero otherwise. Also, wit is a binary program indicator that is equal to
one if unit i receives the treatment in period t, and uit is an error term. Taking differences,
we have:
∆yi = β1 + β2∆wi + ∆ui. (18)
In this framework, β2 is the treatment effect. Moreover, if the changes in the treat-
ment status are not correlated with the error term (i.e., E[∆wi∆ui]), the OLS estimation
of equation 18 will produce consistent parameters. In the case where there are no units
treated in the first period, the OLS estimation can be obtained as:
β2 = ∆y¯treated −∆y¯control, (19)
where y¯treated and y¯control are the sample averages of the outcome variable (y) for the
treatment and control groups, respectively.
We use a panel of schools in which we can identify those that signed the Equality of
Opportunity and Educational Excellence Agreement and received SEP funds from 2009 to
2011 (i.e., the treatment group) and those that decided not to participate in this program
during this period (i.e., the control group).16 In our model, the pre-treatment period is
16Because SIMCE only evaluates students from the fourth, eighth, and tenth grades by turns, we can
only use the data at the school level. Ideally, we would like to use the individual data of students attending
SEP and non-SEP schools, but we cannot follow the same cohort of students each year and use their
SIMCE scores in our analysis. However, since 2006 SIMCE has evaluated fourth graders each year, which
allows us to use school-average SIMCE scores for schools that have participated in the SEP and have
not participated in the SEP and compare their academic performance by using a difference-in-differences
approach.
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defined as the time before the SEP was implemented (i.e., from 2006 to 2008), and the
post-treatment period as the time in which the SEP was in effect (i.e., from 2009 to 2011).
We use the following baseline specification to estimate the effects of the SEP on academic
achievement, in a context of panel data:
SIMCEit = β1λt + β2wit + β3Xit + β4EIPit + ci + uit, ∀t ∈ [1, T ]; (20)
where SIMCEit corresponds to the average score that school i obtained on the SIMCE
(math and language, depending on the econometric specification) in the period t, λt
is a time trend, and wit is a binary program indicator that equals one if the school i
participates in the program at time t and equals zero otherwise. EIPit is the proportion
of the Educational Improvement Plan accomplished by schools in math and language.
This is a measure of the educational reform progress required by the SEP contract. This
variable is always zero during the pre-treatment period (and during the post-treatment
period for non-SEP schools) and goes from zero to 100 during the post-treatment period
for SEP schools.
Additionally, we include a vector of school characteristics, Xit, which contains the
average gross family income and the education level of the parents of the students attend-
ing school i at time t. Finally, we include a fixed individual effect ci and an idiosyncratic
error term uit.
Equation (20) constitutes our baseline empirical model. It allows for aggregate time
effects and controls. We estimate equation (20) using fixed effects to obtain the policy
effect estimator associated with wit.
17 We interpret it as the average effect of the SEP
on a schools’ academic achievement. By using this approach, we are estimating a causal
effect of SEP on school’s academic achievement that could be attributable to the three
channels previously discussed as well as other effects (such as peer effects).
The key identifying assumption is that the trend in test scores would be the same in
both SEP and non-SEP schools in the absence of treatment. Although the treatment and
control individual schools can differ, this difference is meant to be captured by the school
fixed effects. Figure 6 shows the SIMCE scores in the treatment and control groups. We
observe that the trends followed by those school groups are fairly similar until 2008.18
Treatment induces a deviation from this common trend. The treatment is composed by a
higher margin per enrolled student and more competition (in the case of public schools).
Therefore, when we control for fixed effects and observable characteristics of schools,
treatment and control schools are identical except for the fact that, after the SEP, the
treatment schools face more competition (public schools) and receive a higher margin per
enrolled student (public and voucher private schools).
17We estimate equation (20) by OLS using robust standard errors. Considering that in our case
observational units are schools (not individuals), we do not use clusters to estimate standard errors.
Even though we could use clusters at the level of regions, there are no apparent reasons to believe that
there are region’s specific characteristics that may be affecting the effect of SEP.
18Moreover, an important assumption behind specification (20) is that changes in the trend are ex-
clusively explained by (1) the treatment and/or (2) changes in the covariates that control for omitted
school-specific trends.
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V. Data
Our sample is composed of public and voucher private schools that were and were not ex-
posed to the SEP from 2009 to 2011. This database contains information about students’
socioeconomic backgrounds, including variables such as gross family income and the ed-
ucation level of the students’ parents. Our database also includes information about the
proportion of the EIP accomplished by schools that participated in the SEP in 2010. As
we previously explained, the EIP is a plan that details educational reforms intended to
improve SIMCE scores and establishes how financial resources provided by the SEP will
be spent to improve the academic performance of priority students. Because schools define
their EIPs over a period of four years,19 the Ministry of Education decided to carry out
an evaluation before the end of the agreement. In 2010, the ministry evaluated the goals
accomplished by schools in math, language, and management. We use the proportion
of the EIP accomplished in math and language in 2010 as a measure of the educational
reform progress.
We link this information with school academic performance. In particular, we in-
clude the yearly average score that a school obtained on the SIMCE during the period
2006-2011.20 Considering that the SEP was progressively implemented in preschool and
primary education (and only since 2012 in secondary education), we use schools’ average
scores obtained by fourth graders in math and language, which are the only measures of
school performance available for the levels under the SEP.
Using this information, we build a panel for public and voucher private schools
that allows a pre-SEP period and a post-SEP period. We define the pre-SEP period,
or the pre-treatment period, as the three years before the implementation of the SEP
(2006-2008). The post-SEP period, or the post-treatment period, corresponds to the
three years in which schools could receive the SEP by signing an Equality of Opportunity
and Educational Excellence Agreement (2009-2011). By signing the agreement, schools
agreed to carry out specific measures oriented to improve the quality of the education
provided and perform specific actions to encourage the school’s retention and academic
performance of priority students. Therefore, our panel links not only the participation
status of schools in the SEP but also their academic performance on the SIMCE, the
socioeconomic backgrounds of their students, and a measure of relative efficiency of the
goals proposed in their EIP. Tables 5 and 6 show summary statistics of treated and
untreated schools for each year.
19At the end of the four-year period, schools are evaluated on the basis of their performance on the
SIMCE.
20Notice that schools offer a unique quality for all students enrolled at some moment of time. In this
sense, the average score obtained by each school is the relevant outcome to empirically evaluate the forces
analyzed in section 3.
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VI. Results
Table 7 presents the results of equation (20). Columns (1) and (7) show that the effect
of the SEP on math and language is positive, statistically significant (at the 1% level),
and higher for math than for language, when only the time trend (λt) and the policy
indicator (wit) are considered. Despite the fact that the point estimate associated with
math is higher than that for language, the trend coefficient associated with language is
higher than that for math. This could be explained by specific reforms carried out to
increase the quality of the language education content. As a result, SIMCE scores for
language showed an increasing tendency attributable to curriculum reforms that were not
implemented in math. Columns (2) and (3) and (8) and (9) show the estimated coefficients
for math and language when family background is controlled for. After family income and
the years of schooling of both parents are controlled for, the policy indicator is positive
and statistically significant (1%) and remains higher for math than for language.
The next three columns include the proportion of the EIP accomplished by schools
in 2010 in math and language. This variable gives us an idea of how EIP reforms affect
school performance. According to the model developed in section 3, in an environment of
no frictions, this variable should be statistically insignificant. Schools compete through
quality, and the equilibrium education quality supplied to the market should be higher
than the minimum required by the EIP. However, when some frictions exist in the market,
a higher minimum education quality required by the SEP contract should produce higher
improvement in academic achievement in schools that join the SEP system. Therefore, if
the Chilean education market is competitive, we expect that the coefficient of the policy
indicator wit is statistically different from zero but that the coefficient of the proportion
of the EIP accomplished is statistically insignificant. The opposite conclusion is expected
if the Chilean market is not competitive. Of course, a mix of results is also possible. A
positive and significant coefficient of the policy indicator and the proportion of the EIP
accomplished should be a signal of a not fully competitive market where the EIP is, in
some degree, binding with respect to the free-market equilibrium quality.
In all cases, the effect of the SEP on SIMCE scores, as well as the level of completion
of the EIP, remains positive and significant (with the exception of the policy indicator for
language in column [12], which is not significant). According to results in column (6), if a
school accomplished 100% of its math-specific goals proposed for 2010, its average SIMCE
score would rise 4.7 points, in addition to the 2.6-point increase associated with the policy
indicator (wit). For language, a full completion of the reforms implies, on average, 4.1
more points on SIMCE, in addition to the points attributable to the direct effect of the
SEP on the school’s academic performance (see column [12]).21
An additional question is whether or not the SEP has a cumulative effect on school
21In additional regressions, we included dummy variables that equal one for SEP schools one and two
years before the introduction of the SEP system. In this way, we test whether our results can be simply
explained by schools that choose to be SEP receptors changing their behavior before signing the SEP
contract. The conclusions do not change using this specification.
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academic achievement, considering that, in our sample, all schools signed the agreement
in 2009 and remained in the program until 2011. It is possible that the SEP has an
additional effect for each additional year in the program. That lag in the effect of the
SEP on academic achievement could exist for two reasons. First, it is possible that there
are some adjustment costs. For instance, vouchers could increase competition for public
schools and increase the margin per enrolled student for both public and voucher private
schools. Both school types would have incentives to increase their quality. However,
because of some adjustment costs (for instance, the construction of new infrastructure),
the increase in quality would not materialize until some future period. Second, it is
possible that students must be exposed to more than one period of investments in order
to experience improvements in academic achievement.
Table 8 presents the results of equation (20), including the interaction of the policy
indicator and a trend variable λ
′
t that takes a value of zero during the pre-treatment
period and the values of one, two, and three during the post-treatment period for both
SEP and non-SEP schools. By doing this, we capture the average effect of an additional
year in the SEP on SIMCE scores. Columns (1) and (7) indicate that an additional year
increases SIMCE scores by 4.1 points in math and 1.6 points in language, values that are
statistically significant at the 1% level. After including school socioeconomic background
variables (family income and parents’ schooling), results remain positive and significant
and are higher in math than in language. Moreover, when we include the percentage
of EIP completion specific to each subject (columns [4]-[6] for math and [10]-[12] for
language), our results indicate that each additional year of the SEP increases SIMCE
scores by approximately 3.5 points in math and 0.9 points in language. Therefore, a
school that has received SEP funds for three consecutive years and has completed all of
the reforms proposed in its EIP by 2010 would increase its SIMCE score by 13.7 points
in math and 6.6 points in language. To have an idea of the impact of the SEP, we can
consider a school in the 50th percentile of the SIMCE score distribution-254 points in
math and 264 points in language. An increase of 13.7 points would place the school in
the 71st percentile in the math score distribution, while an increase of 6.6 points would
put the school in the 62nd percentile in the language score distribution.
Tables 9 and 10 present the results of the same empirical models of tables 7 and 8,
but only using a sample of voucher private schools. In general, we can observe that the
coefficient on the policy indicator is slightly greater than in the model with both public
and voucher private schools. However, as discussed in section 3, a smaller coefficient was
expected. That is because two channels (more competition and a greater margin per
enrolled student) operate for public schools, but just one (a greater margin per enrolled
student) operates for private schools. We interpret this result as preliminary evidence
that public schools could face incentives and budget constraints that cause those types
of schools to deviate from the profit-maximization goal. Sapelli (2003) shows that public
schools are regulated by a Teaching Statute and receive additional funds from municipali-
ties when necessary. Additionally, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) show that despite extensive
private entry and sustained declines in public enrollments, the aggregate number of mu-
nicipal schools has barely fallen. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) argue that municipal officials
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seem to have been unable or unwilling to close public schools, and, thus, public schools
seem to not face strong incentives to compete. This is reinforced by the fact that, for
these schools, revenue losses are mediated by municipal education budgets, which makes
it possible for them to lose students without automatic consequences on their resources.
The analysis in Sapelli (2003) and Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) could explain why the SEP
has increased academic achievement in public schools, but not by the magnitude expected
according to the theoretical analysis of section 3.
Finally, notice that another testable implication of the model discussed in section
3 is that the effects of the SEP on academic achievement might be lower for schools
receiving higher co-payments. Table 11 presents the estimated coefficients of equation
(20), including the interaction of the policy indicator and the shared financing made by
parents. We conduct this exercise only for voucher private schools, considering that public
schools are not allowed to charge any co-payment to parents. Columns (1) to (12) show
that, as our theoretical model predicts, the coefficient associated with the interaction is
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that the SEP increases
academic achievement in voucher private schools that charge a lower co-payment more
than in schools that receive a higher co-payment. Our theoretical model also predicts
that schools that received a lower co-payment before 2008 have more incentive to enroll
in the SEP program. Table 12 shows that, indeed, voucher private schools that enrolled
in the SEP program charged a lower co-payment than did non-SEP schools before the
introduction of the subsidy.
Overall, our results confirm the positive effects of vouchers on academic achievement.
Additionally, we present novel evidence supporting the importance of conditioning the
delivery of resources to some specific academic goals. According to our findings, this
conditionality has a positive and significant effect on academic achievement in addition
to the direct effect of vouchers. Conditional vouchers could be particularly relevant when
frictions exist in the market.
VII. Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence of (1) the effects of vouchers on the academic
achievement of students and (2) the importance of conditioning the delivery of resources
to some specific academic goals. We focus on the conditional voucher program (SEP)
implemented in Chile in 2008. Different from the previous flat voucher system introduced
in 1981, this new demand subsidy allows us to have a control group to evaluate the effects
of the program. Our empirical strategy considers a difference-in-differences approach
that allows us to remove the biases that result from the comparison of both groups in the
second period and that can be explained by permanent differences between both groups
and differences across time due to group-specific trends.
We find a positive effect of the SEP on standardized test scores. In an environment
of no frictions, the positive effect of vouchers on academic achievement should operate
mainly through two channels. First, the freedom of parents of low-income students to
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choose schools introduces competition for public schools. Second, if the incidence of
the demand subsidy (the voucher) on the supply of education is nonzero, vouchers (or an
increase in the resources delivered by vouchers to schools) increase the margin per enrolled
student (the difference between the total monetary payments and the cost of educating
a student), which encourages schools to attract more students. If there is competition,
education quality increases within both public and private schools through this second
channel.
Additionally, our results highlight the importance of conditioning the delivery of
resources to some specific academic goals. Our findings show that this conditionality has
a positive and significant effect on academic achievement in addition to the direct effect
of vouchers. Conditional vouchers could be particularly relevant when frictions exist in
the market.
Finally, we find a greater effect of the SEP when we consider only a sample of voucher
private schools than when we include both public and voucher private schools. This result
can be explained by the existence of “soft budget constraints” for public schools, which
means that public schools do not face strong incentives to compete.
An interesting avenue for future research is related to the differential effects that the
SEP had on math and language. That is, why did competition promote a higher supply
of education quality in math than in language? One possible explanation is that parents
value a scientific education relatively more than a humanistic education. Therefore, the
demand for schools is more elastic to quality increases in scientific than in humanistic
education. In this scenario, it is more effective for schools to increase the quality of
their math education rather than their language education to attract more students.
Another possible explanation is related to the amount of time required to train students
in math skills and language skills. Many of the skills tested in standardized language
tests are related to reading comprehension and vocabulary acquisition, which require
more instruction time compared with some math skills and whose results take more time
to be observed. A formal empirical test of this hypothesis constitutes an interesting and
important avenue to explore in the future.
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Figure 1: Enrollment Share by Type of School
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Figure 2: SIMCE Scores by Type of School
(a) Math 4th grade, 2002-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Language 4th grade, 2002-2008 
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Figure 3: Family Income by School Dependence
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Source: SIMCE 2008. Notes: Gross family income is expressed in US dollars. 
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Figure 4: Shared Financing and SIMCE Scores (2007)
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Figure 5: Supply of Quality in a SEP System and a Non-SEP System
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Figure 6: SIMCE Scores in the Treatment and Control Groups
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Source: SIMCE 2006-2008. 
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Table 1: Monthly Subsidy per Priority Student (US$)
Pre-Kindergarten 5th and 6th Grades 7th to 12th Grades
to 4th Grade
Monthly per-student subsidy 86.6 57.6 29.1
Source: Ministry of Education (Chile). Notes: Values are for 2012 and are adjusted by purchasing power parity.
Table 2: Monthly Concentration Subsidy per Priority Student (US$)
Concentration of Pre-Kindergarten 5th and 6th Grades 7th to 12th Grades
Priority Students to 4th Grade
15%-30% 6 4 2
30%-45% 10.3 6.9 3.4
45%-60% 13.8 9.2 4.6
≥60% 15.4 10.3 5.2
Source: Ministry of Education (Chile). Notes: Values are for 2012 and are adjusted by purchasing power parity.
Table 3: Flat Voucher and SEP for Pre-Kindergarten and Fourth Graders (US$)
Category Subsidy
Flat voucher 143
SEP 86.6
Concentration subsidy 13.8
Total 243.4
Source: Ministry of Education (Chile). Notes: Values are for 2012 and
are adjusted by purchasing power parity.
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Table 4: Number of School Types
Year Funding Type With SEP Without SEP
2009 Public 4,387 (89.17%) 533 (10.83%)
Voucher private 1,766 (51.65%) 1,653 (48.35%)
2010 Public 4,366 (89.42%) 513 (10.58%)
Voucher private 1,907 (56.30%) 1,480 (43.70%)
2011 Public 4,309 (90.54%) 450 (9.46%)
Voucher private 2,064 (61.47%) 1,294 (38.53%)
Source: Ministry of Education.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics: Public Schools
Year Variable With SEP Without SEP
2006 Math SIMCE 233.11 203.33
Language SIMCE 240.13 216.67
Gross family income (US$) 373.53 408.12
Mother’s education 9.63 10.25
Father’s education 9.73 10.48
2007 Math SIMCE 229.55 226
Language SIMCE 240.12 229
Gross family income (US$) 397.25 445.31
Mother’s education 9.69 9.78
Father’s education 9.78 10.2
2008 Math SIMCE 229.96 215
Language SIMCE 245.78 223.33
Gross family income (US$) 409.99 456.89
Mother’s education 9.60 9.73
Father’s education 9.65 10.02
2009 Math SIMCE 234.59 218.33
Language SIMCE 246.37 235
Gross family income (US$) 396 513.69
Mother’s education 9.69 9.92
Father’s education 9.75 10.38
2010 Math SIMCE 235.83 214
Language SIMCE 256.37 252.67
Gross family income (US$) 451.96 378.11
Mother’s education 9.78 10.09
Father’s education 9.80 10.32
2011 Math SIMCE 244.76 239
Language SIMCE 254.07 253
Gross family income (US$) 468.55 495.47
Mother’s education 9.81 10.3
Father’s education 9.83 10.11
Source: SIMCE 2006-2011 and Ministry of Education (Chile).
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Table 6: Summary Statistics: Voucher Private Schools
Year Variable With SEP Without SEP
2006 Math SIMCE 246.64 268.27
Language SIMCE 252.81 271.21
Gross family income (US$) 503.72 926.68
Mother’s education 11.13 13.13
Father’s education 11.15 13.4
2007 Math SIMCE 245.76 266.56
Language SIMCE 254.58 272.32
Gross family income (US$) 535.58 968.39
Mother’s education 11.16 13.15
Father’s education 11.16 13.31
2008 Math SIMCE 245.82 266.39
Language SIMCE 260.17 276.56
Gross family income (US$) 545.47 1,002.87
Mother’s education 11.07 13.09
Father’s education 11.06 13.2
2009 Math SIMCE 251.09 270.31
Language SIMCE 260.83 276.76
Gross family income (US$) 522.93 980.79
Mother’s education 11.1 13.11
Father’s education 11.08 13.23
2010 Math SIMCE 251.07 267.98
Language SIMCE 270.37 283.71
Gross family income (US$) 600.26 1130.90
Mother’s education 11.2 13.21
Father’s education 11.15 13.29
2011 Math SIMCE 257.26 268.62
Language SIMCE 266.29 276.78
Gross family income (US$) 622.46 1173.91
Mother’s education 11.21 13.18
Father’s education 11.14 13.24
Source: SIMCE 2006-2011 and Ministry of Education (Chile).
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Table 12: Shared Financing Charged by SEP and Non-SEP Schools (US$)
School Category Mean SD
SEP Schools 26.2 41.1
Non-SEP Schools 66.2 17.1
Source: SIMCE 2007.
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